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The information systems literature has long argued 
that innovation drives uncertainties in organizations. 
While extant research has extensively studied 
knowledge problems in the traditional firm setting and 
their implications on organizing and decision making, 
an updated understanding is required in relation to 
uncertainties within digital platforms and ecosystems, 
where organizational boundaries are blurred and 
downstream movement is becoming more popular. To 
address this issue, we explore the different dimensions 
of uncertainties in the digital platforms and ecosystems 
by classifying them based on the knowledge problems 
that dominantly contribute to their formation and the 
platform actors facing such uncertainties. A higher-
level uncertainty emerges as a result of the interactions 
within these dimensions. In addition, the interactions 
evolve in longitudinal and dynamic patterns due to the 
complex nature of digital platforms and ecosystems. 
1. Introduction   
Digital platforms and ecosystems have been 
transforming today’s business landscape. 
Constantinides, Henfridsson, and Parker define digital 
platforms as “a set of digital resources - including 
services and content - that enable value-creating 
interactions between external producers and 
consumers” [1: p. 381]. These resources and interactions 
are organized in a larger ecosystem, which, in this case, 
represents the alignment structure of the multilateral set 
of actors materializing the value [2]. Platform-based 
firms such as Amazon, Google, or Facebook utilize 
information and communication technologies by which 
multiple actors (e.g., platform owners, users, regulators) 
interact at different levels in a complex, evolutionary, 
and dynamic fashion. As a result, uncertainties arise in 
the form of persistent and pervasive challenges facing 
the digital platform and its actors. 
Research in the field of entrepreneurship has 
identified that these uncertainties are driven by different 
types of knowledge problems that new ventures face, 
including ambiguity, equivocality, and complexity [3]. 
Despite the growing number of studies on the 
innovation dynamics in digital platforms [4]–[6], it is 
still unclear how the uncertainties associated with 
platform innovation emerge from different forms of 
knowledge problems as interpreted by the platform 
actors. The goal of this paper is to address this gap 
within the current literature by answering the following 
research question: 
 
How has the emergence of platforms and 
ecosystems as an avenue for innovation changed the 
nature and conceptualization of uncertainty? 
 
To answer this question, we synthesize the current 
literature in the fields of digital platforms and 
innovation uncertainty and develop a set of theoretical 
propositions to understand the role of knowledge 
problems as drivers of uncertainties among actors in 
digital platforms and ecosystems. We conclude with a 
set of questions that outline a future research agenda. 
Our research contributes to the digital platform literature 
in three different ways. First, this paper critically builds 
on a recent review of knowledge problems in the 
entrepreneurship domain [3] and extends the 
conversation into the digital platform context. In doing 
so, we clarify the different sources of uncertainty in 
digital platforms and ecosystems. Second, the paper 
presents platform uncertainty as a multidimensional 
higher-level concept where different platform actors 
deal with different dimensions of uncertainty in a 
dynamic and interactive manner. Lastly, we provide a 
comprehensive research agenda that addresses the 
sources and dimensions of uncertainty, taking into 
consideration the structural and organizational 
challenges of digital platforms and ecosystems. 






2. Literature review  
2.1. Digital platforms and ecosystems 
Platforms have captured the attention of a wide 
array of strategy, economics, and information systems 
researchers over the last decades. From a strategy 
perspective, the discussions of platforms focus on the 
idea of modularity where an architecture design of core 
and periphery is essential to stimulate innovation and 
new product development [7], [8]. The utilization of this 
architectural design has been extended from being an 
internal production capability to an external open 
innovation lever [9], [10]. 
From an economics perspective, platforms are 
special kinds of markets that facilitate an exchange 
among end-users. The concept of external platforms 
supplying innovative products is similar to that of multi-
sided markets in the economics literature [11]–[14]. 
Both strategy and economics research emphasize the 
importance of network effects. Network effects or 
network externalities [15], [16] have been closely 
associated with platforms in which the increased 
number of platform users has an impact on the value 
created for each user [17], [18]. Whereas positive 
network effects refer to the ability of a large, well-
managed platform community to generate significant 
value for each user of the platform, negative network 
effects indicate the possibility that a growing, yet poorly 
managed, platform community can diminish the value 
produced for each user [19]. In addition, there could be 
the issue of network congestion resulting from an 
undesired increase in the network size. These positive or 
negative network effects have also been classified as 
being direct, benefiting the same side of the platform, or 
indirect, benefiting the platform’s cross sides [20]. 
Although industry platforms or multi-sided markets 
are built to exploit the collective technological, social, 
and economic values via resource optimization [21], 
some interactions among the platform actors may result 
in negative externalities. According to Parker et al. [19], 
negative externalities are one of the main causes of 
market failure. In their view, along with Cohen and 
Sundararajan’s [22], negative externalities occur when 
a given interaction results in unintended spillover costs. 
Evans [23] examined the causes of negative externalities 
and recognized their effects on the interacting actors. 
The causes he observed ranged from fraud, 
misrepresentation, and other opportunistic or offensive 
behaviors to poor and asymmetric information. 
From the perspective of information systems 
research, the majority of platform discussions revolve 
around managing digital ecosystems, most specifically 
a software ecosystem, where software-based platforms 
are open to third-party developers [24]. In general, 
platform-based businesses need to have the “right level” 
of governance in order to function optimally. Tiwana et 
al. [4] labeled this issue of balance the “Goldilocks 
Governance Problem” where the platform sponsor is 
challenged to maintain sufficient control on the platform 
activities in order to oversee its integrity and 
functionality, and, at the same time, loosen enough 
control to allow for flexible interactions among actors 
or autonomy among independent developers. Careful 
design for the boundary resources such as application 
programming interfaces (API) helps platform owners 
understand the tension between opening and controlling 
the platform [25]. 
The review of platform research in the different 
streams of literature shows the central role of the 
network effect in maximizing the value of the platform. 
The optimization of the network effect in the strategy 
and information systems literature is mainly a question 
of creating efficiency and open innovation, while in 
economics, it is a question of balancing the network 
size. 
The diversity in the digital platform literature 
leaves us with a wide variety of digital platform 
classifications. As noted by Kenney and Zysman [26], 
the proliferation of labels used to describe platforms and 
the new economy built on these platforms is a mere 
reflection of their significant consequences for society, 
markets, and firms. 
 In this paper, we adopt a general classification of 
digital platforms based on their main functions: 
transaction and innovation [27].  Transaction platforms 
facilitate exchange or transaction among the platform’s 
users. Examples include Uber, Airbnb, and Amazon 
Marketplace. On the other hand, innovation platforms 
facilitate innovation by allowing “complementors,” 
external users producing complementary goods and 
services, to innovate using the platform’s core 
technology [28]. Examples of innovation platforms 
include Google Android, Apple iOS, and Amazon Web 
Services (AWS). We can also see hybrid companies that 
operate using both transaction and innovation platforms. 
For example, Amazon presents its marketplace as a 
transaction platform and its AWS as an innovation 
platform.    
Platforms of either type adopt a unique architectural 
design that extends their functionality and sets them up 
for success and evolvability within a digital ecosystem 
[6]. The architectural design allows for mobilizing 
external users in a generative ecosystem [29], where 
large and diverse groups of actors produce unanticipated 
changes [30]. One of the defining features of this 
generative ecosystem is the multilateral 
interdependence across the actors and their activities 
[2]. Understanding this multilateral interdependence 
requires a more dynamic and holistic view of 
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interactions in digital platforms and ecosystems. This 
view acknowledges high levels of complexity leading to 
various uncertainty challenges.  
In the following sections, we refer to the innovation 
management literature to review extant research on 
uncertainty and related knowledge problems. 
2.2. Uncertainty in innovation 
In his seminal article, Dosi [31] considered the 
uncertain nature of inventive activity, one of the main 
aspects of the innovative process. The reason for such 
uncertainty is the unlimited and unknown sets of choices 
and outcomes. Uncertainty has been distinguished from 
risk, which is the lack of knowledge about probabilities 
[32]. These probabilities cannot be assigned in the case 
of uncertainty as they can be with risk. Thus, an 
unforeseeable notion of uncertainty can be defined as an 
organization's inability “to recognize the relevant 
influence variables and their functional relationships” 
[33: p. 1334]. 
Different areas of research have looked at 
uncertainty as a factor that influences organizational 
processes [34]–[36]. Other areas have looked at 
different manifestations of uncertainty in the innovation 
process. Uncertainty results from different sources such 
as technological complexity, competition, consumer 
behavior, or political or regulatory changes [37]–[39].  
One of the common dimensions underlying many 
uncertainty studies is the level of uncertainty, i.e., 
whether it is a firm-specific uncertainty or a market-
based uncertainty [40]. Technological uncertainty 
related to the inventive process is an example of firm-
specific uncertainties [41]. Perceived environmental 
uncertainty [35], such as regulatory uncertainty [37], is 
an example of market-based uncertainty that is external 
and shared across a set of firms. 
Although it has been studied extensively in 
different streams of research, uncertainty as a concept 
still needs a better definition and a greater precision 
given the multidimensional nature of unknowingness. A 
recent review of the literature on knowledge problems 
and entrepreneurial action calls for establishing clearer 
boundary conditions among ambiguity, complexity, 
equivocality, and uncertainty as different manifestations 
of unknowingness [3]. In addition to the lack of 
conceptual precision, researchers have mainly relied on 
the varied empirical contextual factors to approximate 
the level of uncertainty.  
Defining uncertainty as a problem of lack of 
knowledge implies that it can be reduced by increasing 
the availability of relevant information. Thus, theories 
on organizational learning and knowledge-based views 
of the firm are helpful to manage uncertainty and other 
knowledge-related problems [42]–[44]. Acquiring such 
knowledge, however, is not an easy process, especially 
in an innovation context. Innovation requires 
knowledge that varies in both depth and breadth, 
requiring a considerable set of knowledge components. 
The greater the set of knowledge components required, 
the higher the expected uncertainty or variability of the 
innovation outcomes [41]. 
 
2.3. Knowledge problems 
 
Since one of our goals is to conceptualize the notion 
of uncertainty within the context of digital platforms and 
ecosystems, it is critical to understand relevant 
knowledge problems related to uncertainty. A 
knowledge problem denotes “an epistemological 
obstacle to strategic action that manifests in terms of the 
novelty being confronted along one or more dimensions 
of action, including what is being done, who is doing it, 
why they are doing it, and when, where, or how they are 
doing it.” [3: p. 661]. In an entrepreneurship context, the 
notion of uncertainty has been distinguished from other 
knowledge problems that fall under the spectrum of 
unknowingness ranging from ignorance to certainty [3]. 
These knowledge problems are: (1) Ambiguity, wherein 
actors can predict potential outcomes of their decision 
based on the information they possess but cannot 
specify the probabilities of these multiple outcomes due 
to the opaqueness [45] or absence of relevant 
information [46]. This situation results in a multiplicity 
of impermanent interpretations [47] and incapability of 
sensemaking [48]; (2) Complexity, wherein numerous 
variables are involved in a problem and further interact 
with each other dynamically over time [49]. This 
complexity brings in inadequate understanding due to a 
lack of clear explanations; (3) Equivocality, wherein 
multiple meanings about organizational activities 
generate conflicting interpretations [50], whether 
presented individually or collectively [51].  
These three knowledge problems (i.e., ambiguity, 
complexity, equivocality) differ from uncertainty 
“based on the typical structure of decision rules that 
reflect the role of information or the steps taken to 
resolve the knowledge problem” [3: p. 674]. While 
entrepreneurs can cope with the problem of uncertainty 
by increasing the amount of information through 
systematic search, ambiguity can only be managed 
through intersubjective agreement. In the case of 
complexity and equivocality, the increased amount of 
information may exacerbate knowledge problems [3].  
In the context of digital platforms and ecosystems, 
uncertainty problems could require more than 
increasing the amount of available information.  
Different actors (e.g., owners, users, and regulators) 
may encounter epistemic uncertainties which can be 
resolved by advancing knowledge and understanding 
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(e.g., increasing understanding regarding potential 
values that would be affected by technology during 
early design stages) [52]. Actors may also face 
ontological uncertainties derived from the mediation 
and extensibility characteristics of digital platforms, 
which cannot be managed by advancing knowledge or 
understanding [52]. To address such ontological 
uncertainties, de Reuver et al. [52] have suggested the 
consideration of the reflexivity phase within value-
sensitive design (VSD). Initially, VSD methods help 
identify critical values during the design phase of new 
technologies, assuming that there is only epistemic 
uncertainty about which values will be affected by a 
technology. Reflexivity was suggested to cope with 
evolving ontological uncertainty in digital platforms. 
Reflexivity ensures enough flexibility in platform 
designs, wherein platform actors gain more information 
throughout the platform dynamic life cycle [52]. 
Consequently, actors can detect potential negative 
values generated by the employment of new technology.  
It is essential to understand whether the knowledge 
problems fall under epistemic uncertainties or 
ontological uncertainties. This understanding could be 
achieved by paying close attention to the potential 
misdiagnosis of uncertainty as another knowledge 
problem, which results from the mismatch between the 
perceived knowledge problem and the actual knowledge 
problem [3]. Such misdiagnosis may mislead 
managerial decisions and result in financial loss. 
To address this issue, we present an additional level 
of analysis to classify uncertainty in the platform 
context. The purpose of our classification is to 
distinguish among different dimensions of uncertainty 
based on the knowledge problems that dominantly 
contribute to their formation and the different actors 
facing such uncertainty in the digital platforms and 
ecosystems. 
3. Knowledge problems and the dimensions 
of uncertainty in digital platforms and 
ecosystems 
Given the dynamic nature of digital platforms and 
ecosystems where actors actively interact and 
implement innovative technologies within an open 
platform structure, multiple dimensions of the 
uncertainty problem have surfaced. Yet, it is still unclear 
how these uncertainty dimensions may manifest among 
the different groups of actors. Therefore, we utilize 
classification as “a fundamental mechanism for 
organizing knowledge” [54: p. 291] to categorize the 
different dimensions of uncertainty based on how they 
contribute to different actors’ uncertainties. This section 
presents this further layer of classification along with 
relevant propositions on how different types of 
knowledge problems contribute to multiple dimensions 
of uncertainties among three main categories of actors 
in digital platforms and ecosystems: platform owners, 
users, and regulators. 
Table 1 displays a summary of how different 
knowledge problems (i.e., complexity, equivocality, and 
ambiguity) act as dominant sources for the proposed 
dimensions of uncertainty among multiple actors within 
digital platforms and ecosystems. 
 
Table 1 Dimensions of uncertainty and 
knowledge problems in digital platforms and 
ecosystems 
 
The first platform actor category presented in Table 
1 is the Platform Owners. The literature identifies four 
types of uncertainties that owners of digital platforms 
may have to manage in order to boost digital innovation 
capabilities [55]. They include (1) Resource uncertainty 
(i.e., uncertainty about how combined resources from 
multiple independent firms would create new value 
towards digital innovation ecosystem), (2) Coordination 
uncertainty (i.e., coordination of information and 
technologies to implement strategies mainly involving 
suppliers and customers), (3) Timing uncertainty (i.e., 
managing resources with the right scale in a timely 
manner) [53], and (4) Market uncertainty (i.e., the 
variability in demand for the firm’s services or products) 
[56]. 
 Resource uncertainty is inherent in the generative, 
combinatorial nature of the digital innovation processes 
carried out by large, varied, and uncoordinated actors 
[29], [57], [58]. This resource uncertainty is closely 
associated with coordination uncertainty given the 
different priorities and objectives of the actors in the 
platforms’ ecosystem. Despite effective coordination 
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and resource management, platforms can still be 
challenged by timing and market uncertainties caused 
by the need to understand and respond to market 
changes in a real-time manner. The lack of explanation 
of uncertainty elements and the constantly changing 
information within the innovative platform ecosystem 
could lead to a lack of understanding on how to manage 
such resources, coordination, timing, and market 
uncertainties [55]. For example, Homejoy, a cleaning 
services marketplace, has struggled to generate and 
maintain a reliable income for its service providers due 
to the actively changing supply and demand. The 
inadequate understanding of the market complicates the 
decision making. As a result, Homejoy was forced to 
shut down the business within less than 5 years after it 
was founded [59]. This example demonstrates the 
struggle to coordinate resources within a dynamic 
digital platform in a way that guarantees consistent flow 
in supply and demand. Therefore, we posit that: 
 
Proposition 1: Complexity is the main factor that 
impacts resource, coordination, timing, and market 
uncertainties faced by platform owners within digital 
platforms and ecosystems. 
 
The second platform actor category listed in Table 
1 is the Platform Users. Platform users (e.g., service 
providers and service recipients) may encounter 
different forms of uncertainties including technological 
uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Technological 
uncertainty has been discussed in the literature at the 
firm level, wherein companies maintain conflicting 
sensemaking about the technological environment that 
is feasible to become dominant in the industry [60], [61]. 
Such type of uncertainty can be resolved by adopting a 
forward-looking approach to capture expected 
upcoming uncertainty that the firm may face rather than 
relying on historical information about the deployed 
technology [62].  
Technological uncertainty is also experienced by 
the platform users: both the external third-party 
complementors, and the recipients of the 
complementary services. They gather information about 
fast-moving new platform-based technologies. As most 
of this information might be contradictory, users spend 
time and effort evaluating the complementarity services 
within these technologies. Conflicting interpretations 
among users challenge the decision-making about the 
ideal technology to utilize. 
The second form of users' uncertainties in a 
platform setting is behavioral uncertainty, when actions 
and performance are hard to predict, which can also be 
referred to as a secondary uncertainty [63]. The 
behavioral dimension of uncertainties tends to evolve by 
the lack of agreement upon available information in 
both transaction and innovation platforms, which leads 
to the absence of cohesive interpretation needed to 
manage uncertain events. For example, Uber’s and 
Airbnb’s providers might have been able to address 
uncertainty issues related to the technological structure 
of the platform prior to or at the time of transaction, 
however, it might be a challenge to manage behavioral 
uncertainty experienced by the platform users (e.g., the 
sexual assault and abuse incidents on ride-sharing 
services) [64]. Therefore, platform users tend to 
disproportionately seek the most reputable service and 
product providers under high technological and 
behavioral uncertainty [65]. Hence, we propose: 
 
 Proposition 2: Equivocality is the key driver for 
technological and behavioral user uncertainties in 
digital platforms and ecosystems. 
 
The third platform actor category illustrated in 
Table 1 is the Platform Regulators. Platform regulators 
face uncertainty in terms of policies governing platform-
based businesses and industries [66]. The opaque or 
deficient information regarding digital platforms’ 
boundaries in their dynamic states may result in a 
multiplicity of impermanent interpretations or even 
misinterpretations of the necessary regulations. 
Accordingly, the regulators are challenged to determine 
and enforce the necessary regulatory environment for 
the digital platforms and ecosystems [37]. In order to 
cope with this type of uncertainty, regulators need to 
collect information about digital platforms and 
ecosystems in their flux states. They must use creativity 
and imagination to predict and manage future 
uncertainties that they may face. Accordingly, we 
propose the following: 
 
Proposition 3: Ambiguity related to the nature of 
platforms plays a major role in creating the uncertainty 
faced by the platform regulators.  
 
To recap, this section presents a classification of 
uncertainties based on their source of knowledge 
problems including complexity, equivocality, and 
ambiguity. Given the fact that digital platforms may 
possess epistemological and ontological uncertainties, it 
is critical to clearly identify the type of knowledge 
problems related to these uncertainties. 
4. The dynamic interplay within the 
multidimensional uncertainty in digital 
platforms and ecosystems 
The different dimensions of uncertainty in digital 
platforms and ecosystems are not managed in isolation 
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from each other. The growing complexity resulting from 
the distributed and multilateral nature of digital 
platforms and ecosystems implies dynamic and 
evolving interactions. Platforms and ecosystems 
uncertainty emerges in unique constellations depending 
on the history of interactions and sequences of actors' 
responses to their respective uncertainties. 
Before we demonstrate a possible trajectory of 
these dynamic interactions, we recognize the need for a 
holistic definition of platforms and ecosystems 
uncertainty- here we define this concept as: 
 
A path-dependent higher level of unpredictability 
that dynamically emerges from the interactions between 
the uncertainties experienced by the different actors in 
the platform ecosystem and how these actors respond to 
their respective uncertainties. 
 
Figure 1 The dynamic interplay between 
different dimensions of uncertainties in digital 
platforms and ecosystems 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the dynamic interplay 
between the three proposed dimensions of platform 
uncertainties. The additional circles behind the three 
dimensions of uncertainty represent the influence of 
uncertainties experienced over time by the multiple 
actors. We speculate that the uncertainties experienced 
by the platform owners, the platform users, and the 
platform regulators may be modified in response to the 
other actors’ actions while dealing with these 
uncertainties.  
Constant challenges arise from these emergence 
and dependability features of different dimensions of 
uncertainties. For example, a buyer in a multi-sided 
platform encounters a behavioral uncertainty induced by 
the potential variability of offerings provided by the 
platform’s sellers. Platforms, by design, are prone to 
instability in the quality of the collective offerings due 
to the reliance on third-party independent providers. 
This instability is particularly problematic if it involves 
offending and opportunistic behaviors such as fraud or 
misrepresentation. To cope with behavioral uncertainty, 
buyers on the platform want to have access to more 
sellers, to examine ratings and reviews by prior buyers, 
and to see evidence of seller’s verification managed by 
the platform. 
The behavioral uncertainties faced by the 
platform’s users continuously shape the governance and 
control mechanisms applied by the platform owner. The 
mechanisms vary from the design of boundary resources 
that cultivate third-party providers development [67] to 
openness and gatekeeping decisions, two closely related 
strategic decisions implying the ease of restrictions to 
use or join the platforms [68]. However, these control 
and governance decisions could lead to resource 
uncertainty for the platform owner. From one side, the 
platform can lose the optimal balance in terms of user 
size on the different sides of the platform. This in turn 
might lead to network externality related to congestion 
on one side and scarcity on the other side.  One of the 
ways the platform can respond to these resource 
uncertainties is by implementing temporary 
incentivizing strategies to balance supply and demand. 
An example of such strategies is surge pricing in ride-
sharing platforms.  
While these incentives help put more drivers on the 
road, regulators worry about the number of working 
hours for drivers, i.e., exceeding 12 hours in a day. Such 
concern is closely linked to other aspects of platform 
labor regulations including providing insurance 
coverage to the drivers. Regulators such as the European 
Commission have been studying proposals to deal with 
regulatory uncertainties related to digital platforms. 
Their objective is to allow platforms to thrive while 
making sure users are treated fairly and conscientiously 
[69]. Imposing local domestic regulations on digital 
platforms contributes to the complexity of managing the 
platforms and ecosystems. Many platform-based firms, 
such as ride-sharing platforms, define themselves as 
players in the global technology industry rather than 
participants in a local transportation industry. Because 
of that, they do not agree with sectoral regulatory 
policies imposed by local courts.  
The cycle continues as new platform owner 
uncertainties arise in response to the changing 
regulatory policies. In that way, the different dimensions 
of uncertainty and the way the multiple platform actors 
decide to respond to them emerge into different 
constellations of platform and ecosystem higher-level 
uncertainties.    
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5. Conclusion and insights for future 
research  
In this paper, we argued that complexity, 
equivocality, and ambiguity contribute to different 
dimensions of uncertainty in digital platforms and 
ecosystems. In doing so, we explain how the 
conceptualization of uncertainty is influenced by the 
structural aspects of digital platforms and ecosystems. 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we classify the 
dimensions of uncertainty in platforms and ecosystems 
based on the knowledge problem that dominantly 
contributes to these dimensions. Second, we 
conceptualize platforms and ecosystems uncertainty as 
a higher level of unpredictability concerning the 
multiple actors in the platform ecosystem. Third, we 
articulate the possible pattern by which this uncertainty 
emerges from the interactions among the actors’ 
uncertainties and the way they choose to respond to 
them.  
Future research may extend our classification of 
uncertainty dimensions by addressing different levels to 
categorize uncertainties in relation to other potential 
knowledge problems. In addition, we highlight several 
areas for extending and enhancing our research. One 
important avenue for research concerning the 
complexity of digital platforms and ecosystems. Some 
unexplored questions in this domain include: 
● Considering the complexity and the multilateral 
interdependence in digital platforms and 
ecosystems, how may problems experienced by 
individual actors transform into a concern for the 
collective community over time? 
● How is collective sensemaking in the context of 
digital platforms and ecosystems different from 
sensemaking in the traditional organizational 
context? 
Ambiguity in digital platforms is another critical 
area that requires further investigation by incorporating 
the regulators’ perspectives.  Here are a few suggested 
questions: 
● How can digital platforms introduce and apply 
appropriate scaling strategies while managing 
ambiguity levels for users and regulators? 
● What are the effects of regulators’ ambiguities on 
the potential growth of platforms and ecosystems? 
● How can regulators institutionalize an adaptive set 
of regulations governing the dynamic digital 
platforms and ecosystems? 
Equivocality in the context of digital platforms is 
also in a position for future research The following 
questions provide an initial proposal in that direction: 
● What is the effect of equivocality among actors of 
the platform and ecosystem on the collective value 
creation and capture?  
● How can the platform owner manage the 
equivocality problem among the actors of the 
platform and ecosystem? 
Finally, uncertainty in digital platforms and 
ecosystems remains a critical topic that requires further 
examination due to its dynamic and evolving nature. 
The following questions could guide future research:  
● What are the costs incurred by the platform due to 
excessive regulatory uncertainty? Regulatory 
delays? Or constant and incoherent legislative 
reviews?  
● How can the platform utilize users' sense of 
community to manage behavioral uncertainty? 
● What are the implications of platforms and 
ecosystems structural/relational characteristics on 
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